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Abstract Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings captured by
various widely studied 2 × 2 games. This article develops a repeated game model that
allows us to systematically investigate turn-taking behavior in many 2 × 2 games,
including the battle of the sexes, the game of chicken, the game of common-pool-
resources assignment, and a particular version of the prisoners’ dilemma. We consider
the “turn taking with independent randomizations” (TTIR) strategy that achieves three
objectives: (a) helping the players reach the turn-taking path, (b) resolving the question
of who takes the good turn first, and (c) deterring defection. We determine conditions
under which there exists a unique TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as a
subgame-perfect equilibrium. We also show that there exist conditions under which
an increase in the “degree of conflict” of the stage game leads to a decrease in the
expected number of periods in reaching the turn-taking path.
Keywords Conflict · Coordination · Turn taking · Intertemporal cooperation
JEL Classification C70 · C72
1 Introduction
Turn-taking behavior is observed in a variety of field and laboratory settings. An exam-
ple of turn taking concerns the use of common-pool resources (CPRs) such as fisheries,
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irrigation systems, and forests. In communities that depend heavily on such resources
for their economic livelihood, failure to resolve problems related to the use of these
resources can lead to significant welfare loss and violent conflicts. One illustration of
the conflicts studied in the CPR literature is the game of CPR assignment in Ostrom
et al. (1994, pp. 58–61). In this game, two fishermen independently decide to go to
one of two fishing spots in their community. The good spot has a value of h, and the
bad spot has a value of l, where h > l > 0. If the two fishermen choose different
spots, each will obtain the respective value of the spot. If they choose the same spot,
they will split the value of the spot equally.
Both coordination and conflict elements (Friedman 1994, pp. 7–8) are present in
this game. To maximize total surplus, the fishermen should choose different fishing
spots; however, they may end up at the same spot if there is no coordination. More-
over, a conflict element is present because while both players prefer going to different
spots rather than to the same spot, each prefers to go to the good spot, while the other
choosing the bad one. If this game is played repeatedly, one might expect that some
sort of rotation scheme, in which the fishermen take turns going to the good spot, will
eventually be adopted. In fact, Berkes (1992) reports that fishermen in Turkey employ
a turn-taking scheme to allocate fishing spots. Rotation schemes in the use of irrigation
system have been observed in Spain and the Philippines (Ostrom 1990).
Turn taking is also observed in other settings. For example, faculty members in a
department may use turn taking to resolve the question of who will serve as the depart-
mental representative on a university committee. Soldiers in a military operation often
take turns to serve as the “point man” in dangerous missions (Bergerud 1993). These
examples possess the feature of the repeated best-shot public good game, in which the
socially available amount of public good is the maximum of individual contributions
(Harrison and Hirshleifer 1989). Turn taking in another game—the repeated battle of
the sexes—has also been mentioned in the literature, dating back to Luce and Raiffa
(1957).
Researchers have also observed turn-taking behavior in laboratory games, ranging
from a repeated CPR appropriation externality game (Prisbrey 1992, Chap. 1), to the
repeated best-shot public good game (Bornstein et al. 1997) and the repeated traffic
route choice game (Helbing et al. 2005).1 In all three studies, eventual turn taking
with initial coordination failure is widely observed.2 Furthermore, all three studies
suggest that when the stage game is a symmetric 2 × 2 game (i.e., with two players
and two actions), turn taking often takes the form of single-period alternation between
the players.
The literature reviewed above suggests that turn taking behavior is important
in many settings captured by widely studied games with binary choices, and the
1 Bornstein et al. (1997) call the game used in their experiments a game of chicken, but they mention that
the payoff structure is qualitatively similar to but slightly different from the traditional game of chicken.
As seen from Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989), it is more appropriate to call the game studied in Bornstein
et al. (1997) a best-shot public good game.
2 All these laboratory studies concern games with complete information, which is the case considered in
this article. Kaplan and Ruffle (2007) study a repeated entry game with incomplete information, in which
a player’s payoff of entry depends on private information. They find that many subjects take turns to enter
to avoid efficiency loss due to simultaneous entry.
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Table 1 Strategies and payoffs of the stage game
(a) The h and l specification
1\2 Tough Soft
Tough (t, t) (h, l)
Soft (l, h) (s, s)
(b) The λ and θ specification
1\2 Tough Soft
Tough (t, t)
(
θλ
1+θ , λ1+θ
)
Soft
(
λ
1+θ , θλ1+θ
)
(s, s)
experimental evidence suggests that delay in reaching successful turn taking is com-
mon. This raises the question of how differences in the structure of the game can affect
turn-taking behavior, including the length of delay in reaching turn taking. This article
analyzes turn taking in a repeated symmetric 2 × 2 game that nests many well-known
games as special examples. In the stage game of the repeated game analyzed in this
article, each player chooses between Tough (T ) and Soft (S). As seen in the top panel
of Table 1, each player obtains payoff t if both choose the same action T , and each
obtains payoff s if both choose S. A player obtains payoff h if she chooses T and the
other player chooses S.3 In this case, the other player obtains a lower payoff l. We
assume that h + l > max {2s, 2t}, so that the two asymmetric outcomes (T, S) and
(S, T ) maximize total payoffs in this game.
To capture the kind of “trial and error” process that players use to resolve the coor-
dination and conflict problems, as well as the observation that turn taking often takes
the form of single-period alternation, we consider a simple strategy—to be called
the “turn taking with independent randomizations” (TTIR) strategy—in this paper.
Players using this strategy randomize between T and S in the beginning period and
also if either of the symmetric outcomes is observed in the preceding period, or rotate
between the two asymmetric outcomes if one of these outcomes is reached in the
preceding period.
We determine the conditions under which a TTIR strategy profile can be supported
as a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We find that whenever there exists a TTIR strategy
profile that constitutes an equilibrium, it must be unique and symmetric (i.e., each
player adopts the same randomization probability in equilibrium). Moreover, there
are systematic differences between the games in which the two asymmetric outcomes
are Nash equilibria in the stage game (to be called the accommodating case), and those
with (T, T ) as the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game (to be called the mutual-
tough case). We find that the TTIR strategy can be supported as an equilibrium for any
3 We use female pronouns throughout this article; their male counterparts get their turn in a companion
paper.
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discount factor in the accommodating case, but it can be supported as an equilibrium
in the mutual-tough case if and only if the players are sufficiently patient.
In addition, we derive two sets of testable implications. First, we study the equilib-
rium delay. Stimulated by the results in Lau and Mui (2008) regarding the repeated
battle of the sexes, we define the degree of conflict (θ) of the stage game as the ratio
of the two players’ payoffs at an asymmetric outcome (θ = hl ). It is natural to con-jecture that equilibrium delay is increasing in the degree of conflict, since a higher
degree of distributional conflict induces the players to behave more aggressively by
choosing Tough with a higher probability in the initial periods. We find that this con-
jecture is correct for the mutual-tough case. However, for the accommodating case,
there are games (such as the game of chicken) with the counter-intuitive feature that
equilibrium delay is not always increasing in the degree of conflict. Second, for the
mutual-tough case, we examine how changes in the primitives of the stage game affect
the difficulty in supporting the TTIR strategy as an equilibrium through their effects
on the critical discount factor. Overall, the results suggest that both the difficulty in
sustaining turn-taking behavior, and how the expected length of delay is affected by
the primitives of the game, depend crucially on whether the two asymmetric outcomes
are Nash equilibria of the stage game.
We are not aware of any prior contribution that develops a unified analysis of turn-
taking behavior in widely studied 2 × 2 games. There are, however, other work that
feature turn-taking strategies. Our article is related to several papers analyzing various
2 × 2 games.4 Motivated by power sharing arrangements in politics, Ward (1998)
studies conditions under which players will not defect from turn taking in the repeated
game of chicken and a version of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Ward (1998), how-
ever, does not provide an equilibrium analysis of how players resolve the questions
of how to get onto a turn-taking path and who has the good turn first. This article
addresses these issues.
Lau and Mui (2008) consider turn taking in the repeated battles of the sexes, and
show how a comparison of the “equilibrium” degree of conflict in the repeated battles
of the sexes with its (exogenous) degree of conflict in the stage game provides an intu-
itive way of understanding how turn taking facilitates intertemporal cooperation. This
article builds on some idea of that paper, but there are also substantial differences. This
article analyzes many well-known games, and establish the key differences between
the accommodating and mutual-tough cases, whereas Lau and Mui (2008) only study
the repeated battles of the sexes which is an example of the accommodating case. This
article allows for the possibility that players may randomize with different probabili-
ties, and show that whenever there exists a TTIR profile that constitutes an equilibrium,
it is unique and symmetric. This is more general than the result in Lau and Mui (2008)
that whenever there exists an equilibrium symmetric TTIR strategy profile, it is unique.
Moreover, this article performs comparative statics analysis that is not the focus of
Lau and Mui (2008).
4 Outside the context of 2 × 2 games, researchers have studied collusive strategies that have turn-taking
features in repeated auctions and repeated Bertrand games. See, for example, Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn
(2004) and Athey and Bagwell (2008) and the references cited there.
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Our article is complementary to the work by Bhaskar (2000), who considers the
egalitarian convention (which equalizes, as far as possible, the realized payoffs of the
two players) in the repeated battle of the sexes and the repeated game of chicken.5
He finds that the efficient symmetric equilibrium can be supported by the equalitar-
ian convention, which involves the use of time-varying strategies and has turn-taking
features. Bhaskar’s result is an important normative finding. However, experimental
studies suggest that turn taking in symmetric 2 × 2 games often takes the form of
one-period alternation instead of time-varying sequences (Prisbrey 1992; Bornstein
et al. 1997; Helbing et al. 2005). Another implication of the strategies used in Bhaskar
(2000) is that changes in the parameter values of the game do not affect the expected
length of delay. The positive approach of our work is complementary to the norma-
tive approach of Bhaskar (2000), in that the TTIR strategy considered in this article
assumes that turn taking takes the form of one-period alternation, and we aim to
derive predictions regarding how changes in the parameter values of the game affect
the expected length of delay.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
describes the TTIR strategy and the associated incentive conditions. Section 4 studies
how the TTIR strategy can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium for two
major cases of the game. Section 5 derives comparative static results, and Sect. 6
concludes. Proof of Proposition 1 is reported in the Appendix, and all other proofs are
available upon request.
2 The model
We consider a symmetric infinite-horizon repeated game with discounting. In every
period, each of the two players (called 1 and 2) chooses (perhaps randomly) between
two actions: playing T or playing S. When making a decision in period n, player i
maximizes her intertemporal payoff (which is the discounted sum of the stream of her
current and future single-period payoffs):
∞∑
m=n
δm−nUi (x1m, x2m), (1)
5 Bhaskar (2000) considers the following strategy. Suppose that the realized outcome is (T, S) when an
asymmetric outcome occurs for the first time, with player 1’s current-period payoff of h exceeding player
2’s payoff of l. To implement the egalitarian convention, the players choose (S, T ) in succeeding periods
until the intertemporal payoff of player 2 exceeds that of player 1. At this point, the players switch to playing
Footnote 5 continued
(T, S) until player 1’s intertemporal payoff exceeds player 2’s, and so on. This strategy is more compli-
cated than the TTIR strategy with one-period alternation. Such time-varying sequences induce a different
continuation value than one-period alternation, and hence lead to a different probability of randomization
in the beginning of the game. Computational results suggest that the use of time-varying sequences leads to
a modest efficiency gain compared to one-period alternation. The relatively small gain, and the complexity
involved, may explain why such time-varying pattern of turn taking is not much observed in laboratory
studies.
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where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor, xim (xim = T or S) is the choice of
player i at period m, and Ui (x1m, x2m) is the current-period payoff of player i when
player 1 chooses x1m and player 2 chooses x2m . The players’ payoffs in the stage game
are represented by
Ui (T, T ) = t, Ui (S, S) = s,
U1 (T, S) = U2 (S, T ) = h, U1 (S, T ) = U2 (T, S) = l, (2)
where i = 1, 2, and h, l, s, and t are finite real numbers. (Whenever there is no con-
fusion, the time subscript is ignored.) Payoffs are common knowledge. Each player
observes both players’ actions in earlier periods, but not how the other player random-
izes.
In this article, we assume
h > l, (3)
h + l > 2s, (4)
and
h + l > 2t. (5)
Since interesting turn-taking behavior consists of good and bad turns, we assume (3)
which allows for asymmetric outcomes in the stage game.6 If the two players choose
different actions, their payoffs will be different under assumption (3). Without loss of
generality, we assume that h (“high”) is larger than l (“low”). The specification in (3)
implicitly defines the labels T and S for any given game. For example, T represents
Good Spot and S represents Bad Spot for the game of CPR assignment. On the other
hand, assumptions (4) and (5) ensure that the sum of the players’ payoffs in the two
asymmetric outcomes is higher than that in the two symmetric outcomes.
Summing up, our focus is the class of infinitely repeated games with (1) to (5), and
we shall hereafter denote a game in this class as G∞. The analysis turns out to differ for
two mutually exclusive possibilities (the accommodating case t < l, or the mutual-
tough case t > l), and the differences can be traced to the different pure-strategy
equilibrium (or equilibria) in the stage game. Before analyzing these two cases, it is
helpful to summarize well-known results about the corresponding one-shot games.
When t < l, the two asymmetric joint-payoff-maximizing outcomes (T, S) and
(S, T ) are pure-strategy equilibria of the stage game. (There is also a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium.) Key examples for this case include (a) battle of the sexes
(with h > l > t = s), (b) the version of game of chicken (h > s > l > t) with
h + l > 2s, (c) the best-shot public good game (with h > s = l > t), and (d) a
particular version of the game of CPR assignment (Ostrom et al. 1994) when h < 2l,
that is, when the bad spot is not too inferior compared to the good spot.
6 Assumption (3) eliminates the pure coordination game from our analysis, but many widely studied games
are consistent with this assumption.
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On the other hand, when t > l, each player’s dominant strategy in the stage game is
to choose Tough, and the two asymmetric outcomes are not Nash equilibria. Examples
for this case include (a) a particular version of the prisoners’ dilemma (see, for example,
Dixit and Skeath 1999, Fig. 11.2),7 (b) another version of the game of CPR assignment
when h > 2l, that is, when the good spot is “sufficiently more attractive” than the bad
spot, and (c) the game of CPR appropriation externality (with h > t > s = l and
h + l > 2t) studied by Prisbrey (1992) and Ostrom et al. (1994, Table 3.4c).
3 TTIR strategy
In this article, we study turn taking when there is no communication between the
players. Turn taking is observed in experimental and field settings in which commu-
nication is not possible, but it is also observed in environments in which the players
are able to communicate. We think it is useful to first study turn taking in an envi-
ronment in which the players cannot communicate. In this environment, any benefit
accrued to the players in mitigating conflict and enhancing coordination is purely
due to turn taking and not to communication. In this setting, two related coordination
and conflict problems have to be resolved. First, how do the players get onto either
one of the two turn-taking sequences {. . . , (T, S) , (S, T ) , (T, S) , (S, T ) , . . .} and
{. . . , (S, T ) , (T, S) , (S, T ) , (T, S) , . . .}? Second, who gets to start with the good
turn first?
The experimental evidence reviewed above suggest that in the absence of preplay
communication, players go through some kind of trial and error process to resolve the
coordination and conflict problems. To capture this process in a parsimonious way, we
consider the TTIR strategy that specifies the following: (a) In the beginning period, the
players will independently randomize between T and S. Denote player i’s probability
of choosing T as pi (i = 1, 2). For meaningful TTIR strategy, p1 and p2 are restricted
to lie in the open interval (0, 1). (b) As long as the randomization yields the sym-
metric outcome of either (T, T ) or (S, S), the randomization phase will continue. (c)
Whenever randomization succeeds in getting the players to the asymmetric outcome
of either (T, S) or (S, T ), the game will switch to the turn-taking phase in which each
player chooses the action her opponent took in the previous period. If no player defects
from this strategy, the turn-taking phase will continue. (d) Any defection by a player
(or by both players) during the turn-taking phase will trigger a switch back to the
randomization phase, and this randomization phase will continue until randomization
succeeds in getting the players to the asymmetric outcome of either (T, S) or (S, T )
7 Dixit and Skeath (1999, Figs 11.1, 11.2) consider two games to study the issue of collective action in
building an irrigation project. Each of these games satisfies the two usual key properties of the prisoners’
dilemma (with h > s > t > l), namely, that Defect is the dominant strategy for both players, and the
outcome (Cooperate, Cooperate) Pareto dominates (Defect, Defect). In the first game (with h + l < 2s),
(Cooperate, Cooperate) is the joint-payoff-maximizing outcome. This is the game that most analyses of the
prisoners’ dilemma focus on, and we refer to it as the “standard” prisoners’ dilemma. In the other game
Footnote 7 continued
(their Fig. 11.2, with h + l > 2s), the two asymmetric outcomes—that is, when one player defects and the
other cooperates—maximize the players’ total payoff. This non-standard prisoners’ dilemma has also been
studied by Ward (1998).
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again.8 (e) Once randomization succeeds in getting the players to either asymmetric
outcome, the players will again behave according to steps (c) and (d).
We determine the conditions under which the TTIR strategy can be supported
as a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Whether the TTIR strategy profile constitutes an
equilibrium depends on the incentive conditions in the randomization and turn-taking
phases, which we now consider.
3.1 Players’ behavior in the turn-taking phase
Define V H (resp. V L) as a player’s intertemporal payoff at a period in which she
plays Tough (resp. Soft) and her opponent plays Soft (resp. Tough), with the expecta-
tion that both players will choose the equilibrium TTIR strategy in the future. Define
V ∗i (i = 1, 2) as player i’s intertemporal payoff in the randomization phase (including
the beginning period), with the expectation that both players will choose the equilib-
rium TTIR strategy in the future.9
The two value functions of the turn-taking phase are given by
V H = h + δV L = h + δl
1 − δ2 , (6)
and
V L = l + δV H = l + δh
1 − δ2 . (7)
To ensure that (6) and (7) are well defined, we need to check two no-deviation condi-
tions for each player in the turn-taking phase, one at a player’s good turn and the other
at her bad turn.
If players i and j (i, j = 1, 2 and i = j) in the previous period chose S and T ,
respectively, then, player i will not deviate in the current period when
V H − (s + δV ∗i
) = (h − s) + δ
(
V L − V ∗i
)
> 0. (8)
Similarly, if the actions of players i and j in the previous period were T and S,
respectively, then player i will not deviate in the current period when
V L − (t + δV ∗i
) = (l − t) + δ
(
V H − V ∗i
)
> 0. (9)
8 Our analysis focuses on the specification in which defection during the turn-taking phase will trigger a
switch back to the randomization phase. As explained in Sect. 4.3, however, our results are robust to other
punishment strategies.
9 Note that this notation implicitly allows for the possibility that the two players’ intertemporal payoffs
in the randomization phase are different. This can occur if each player uses a different randomization
probability in equilibrium.
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Table 2 Strategies and intertemporal payoffs at the beginning of the repeated game
1\2 Playing tough at period 0 Playing soft at period 0
Playing tough at period 0
(
t + δV ∗1 , t + δV ∗2
) (
V H, V L
)
Playing soft at period 0
(
V L, V H
) (
s + δV ∗1 , s + δV ∗2
)
3.2 Players’ behavior in the randomization phase
Next, we examine the randomization phase (including the beginning period). If both
players use the TTIR strategy, it is easy to see that the game will remain in the ran-
domization phase in the next period if and only if both players choose the same action
in the current period.
For subsequent analysis, it is helpful to define
Vi
(
pi , p j
) = pi p j t + (1 − pi )
(
1 − p j
)
s + pi
(
1 − p j
)
V H + (1 − pi ) p j V L
1 − δ [pi p j + (1 − pi )
(
1 − p j
)] ,
(10)
which gives player i’s intertemporal payoff at the randomization phase when players
i and j choose Tough with probability pi and p j , respectively, since this phase will
continue with probability pi p j + (1 − pi )
(
1 − p j
)
in the next period.
Denote player i’s equilibrium probability of choosing T in the randomization phase
as p∗i . In the randomization phase, player i chooses p∗i to ensure that the other player is
indifferent between playing T and S. It can be deduced from Table 2 that the players’
equilibrium randomization probabilities (p∗1 and p∗2) and equilibrium intertemporal
payoffs (V ∗1 and V ∗2 ) are jointly determined by
V ∗i = p∗j
(
t + δV ∗i
) +
(
1 − p∗j
)
V H = p∗j V L +
(
1 − p∗j
) (
s + δV ∗i
)
, (11)
where i, j = 1, 2 and i = j . Note that V ∗i in (11) is related to the function Vi
(
pi , p j
)
in (10) according to
V ∗i = Vi
(
p∗i , p∗j
)
. (10a)
To examine the conditions characterizing the equilibrium randomization probabilities,
we combine (10), (10a), and the second equality of (11) to obtain
p∗j =
V H − s − δV ∗i(
V H − s − δV ∗i
) + (V L − t − δV ∗i
)
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=
V H − s − δ
{
p∗i p∗j t+(1−p∗i )
(
1−p∗j
)
s+p∗i
(
1−p∗j
)
V H+(1−p∗i )p∗j V L
1−δ
[
p∗i p∗j +(1−p∗i )
(
1−p∗j
)]
}
V H + V L − s − t − 2δ
{
p∗i p∗j t+(1−p∗i )
(
1−p∗j
)
s+p∗i
(
1−p∗j
)
V H+(1−p∗i )p∗j V L
1−δ
[
p∗i p∗j +(1−p∗i )
(
1−p∗j
)]
} ,
(12)
where i, j = 1, 2 and i = j , and V H and V L depend on parameters δ, h, and l
according to (6) and (7). That is, p∗1 ∈ (0, 1) and p∗2 ∈ (0, 1) are the equilibrium
randomization probabilities if they satisfy simultaneously the two equations defined
by (12).
Condition (12) can be interpreted as follows. If the no-deviation conditions (8) and
(9) are satisfied, then player j’s equilibrium randomization probability (p∗j ) in the
current period is given by the middle term of (12), which involves V ∗i , since the game
may remain in the randomization phase in the next period. As given by (10a), player
i’s continuation payoff V ∗i depends on equilibrium randomization probabilities p∗i and
p∗j (in the future). Thus, one can think of p∗j ( j = 1, 2) on the left-hand side of (12) as
the probability that player j choose T in the current period during the randomization
phase, and p∗1 and p∗2 on the right-hand side as the probabilities that the two players
choose T in the future (if the game remains in the randomization phase). The two
equilibrium conditions in (12) are consistency conditions between current and future
randomization probabilities of this infinitely repeated game.
4 Supporting the TTIR strategy as an equilibrium
The TTIR strategy can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated
game G∞ if there exists p∗1 ∈ (0, 1) and p∗2 ∈ (0, 1) that simultaneously satisfy the
no-deviation conditions (8) and (9) during the turn-taking phase and the equilibrium
randomization conditions (12) during the randomization phase. The equilibrium pro-
file is unique if there exists only one pair of p∗1 ∈ (0, 1) and p∗2 ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
these conditions. It is symmetric if p∗1 = p∗2 .
Our formulation allows for asymmetric TTIR strategies. In the Appendix, we show
that no asymmetric TTIR profile can be supported as an equilibrium in the symmetric
game G∞.10 To simplify exposition, we focus on symmetric TTIR strategies (with
p1 = p2) in the main text, and report the discussion of asymmetric TTIR strategies in
the Appendix.
It is natural to expect that the no-deviation condition (8) always holds, since a player
has no incentive to defect when she is supposed to take her good turn. The following
Lemma is useful in establishing condition (8).
Lemma 1 For the repeated game G∞,
V H − [s + δVi (p, p)] > 0 (8a)
10 In particular, we show that no pair of asymmetric randomization probabilities (p1, p2) with p1 = p2
can satisfy the two conditions in (12), even if they satisfy conditions (8) and (9).
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for all δ ∈ (0, 1) and all p ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 1 implies that if there exists p∗ such that p∗1 = p∗2 = p∗ constitutes an
equilibrium, then the no-deviation condition (8) is always non-binding.
Our remaining tasks are to examine under what circumstances the no-deviation
condition (9) at a player’s bad turn holds, and to study the equilibrium randomiza-
tion conditions in (12). The analysis differs for the accommodating and mutual-tough
cases, as the underlying structure of the game is different in these two cases.
4.1 The accommodating case (t < l)
For the accommodating case, we obtain the following Lemma regarding the no-devi-
ation condition (9) when a player is supposed to take her bad turn.
Lemma 2 For the repeated game G∞ with t < l,
V L − [t + δVi (p, p)] = (l − t) + δ
[
V H − Vi (p, p)
]
> 0 (9a)
for all δ ∈ (0, 1) and all p ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 2 implies that for the accommodating case, if there exists a symmetric
TTIR strategy profile that constitutes an equilibrium, then the no-deviation condition
(9) is always non-binding. A player will not defect when she is supposed to take her
bad turn, because by adhering to the equilibrium strategy, she will have both a current
gain of l − t and a future gain of δ (V H − V ∗i
)
.
With Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we show in Proposition 1 that in the accommodating
case of game G∞, for all δ ∈ (0, 1) , there exists a unique and symmetric TTIR profile
that can be supported as an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 For the repeated game G∞ with t < l and δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a
unique TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The TTIR strategy profile is symmetric, with the equilibrium randomization probability
of each player given by
p∗ = −c
b
(13)
if a = 0, or by
p∗ = −b −
√
b2 − 4ac
2a
(14)
if a = 0, where coefficients a, b and c are related to the discount factor and stage-game
payoff parameters according to
a = δ [(1 + δ) (t − s) − (h − l)] , (15)
b =
(
1 − δ2
)
t + (1 + δ)2 s − h − (1 + 2δ) l, (16)
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and
c = h + δl − (1 + δ) s. (17)
4.2 The mutual-tough case (t > l)
As the proof for the accommodating case is relatively straightforward, it may appear
that it would also be easy to obtain the conditions under which (9) holds for the
mutual-tough case by expressing V L and V ∗i in (9) in terms of δ, h, l, s, and t . For
example, one may think of using the closed-form solution for p∗ similar to (13) and
(14) for the accommodating case. However, while (13) and (14) hold for all discount
factors δ ∈ (0, 1) for the accommodating case, they will only hold for sufficiently
high discount factors for the mutual-tough case, as we shall show later. Therefore, we
need to first determine the range of discount factors in which the TTIR strategy can
be supported as an equilibrium and (13) and (14) hold for the mutual-tough case.
In the analysis of the mutual-tough case, we proceed as follows. We first conjecture
that there exists a critical discount factor δTT ∈ (0, 1) such that for δ ∈ (δTT, 1), there
exists a unique symmetric TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as an equilib-
rium. We then show that for all δ ∈ (δTT, 1), if there exists a unique symmetric TTIR
strategy profile that constitutes an equilibrium, the function p∗ (δ) must be strictly
decreasing in δ. These results enable us to determine the value of δTT as a function of
the payoff parameters of the stage game. We then close our proof by showing that for
all δ ∈ (δTT, 1), in fact there exists a unique TTIR strategy profile that constitutes an
equilibrium and it is symmetric.
Assuming first that for all δ ∈ (δTT, 1), there exists a unique symmetric TTIR
strategy profile that can be supported as an equilibrium (with p∗i = p∗j = p∗ and
V ∗i = V ∗j = V ∗), we investigate how the equilibrium randomization probability
changes when only the discount factor changes. The partial derivative ∂p
∗
∂δ
is given in
(19) below. Manipulating various terms in (19) leads to the following Lemma regarding
the monotonicity of p∗ with respect to δ.11
Lemma 3 For the repeated game G∞ with t > l, if for all δ ∈ (δTT, 1), there exists
a unique symmetric TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as a subgame-perfect
equilibrium, then p∗ satisfies
0.5 < p∗ < 1, (18)
and
∂p∗
∂δ
=
(1 − p∗)
[
∂V H
∂δ
− δ ∂V ∗
∂δ
− V ∗
]
− p∗
[
∂V L
∂δ
− δ ∂V ∗
∂δ
− V ∗
]
(
V H − s − δV ∗) + (V L − t − δV ∗) + δ (1 − 2p∗) ∂V ∗
∂p∗
(19)
11 On the other hand, for the accommodating case, we have found examples in which the monotonicity
property of p∗ with respect to δ does not hold.
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is negative.
Lemma 3 is a crucial step in obtaining the critical discount factor for the mutual-tough
case. According to Lemma 3, if for all δ ∈ (δTT, 1), there exists a unique symmetric
TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as an equilibrium, then the function p∗ (δ)
decreases monotonically in δ ∈ (δTT, 1). Moreover, it is clear from (12) that p∗ (δ)
is a continuous function. Combining these features, we conclude that
lim
δ→δTT
p∗ (δ) = 1, (20)
since otherwise we could have found a lower discount factor such that p∗ (δ) is still
less than 1. Equation (20) says that in the limit when δ tends to the critical discount
factor, the punishment of the TTIR strategy becomes most severe as p∗ (δ) tends to 1.
Furthermore, combining (20) and the second equality of (11), we obtain
lim
δ→δTT
[
V L (δ) − t − δV ∗ (δ)
]
= 0. (21)
Equation (21) states that the no-deviation condition at the bad turn must be binding
at the critical discount factor δTT. Using these results, we can determine the critical
discount factor as a function of the payoff parameters of the stage game.
Lemma 4 For the repeated game G∞ with t > l, if for all δ ∈ (δTT, 1), there exists
a unique symmetric TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as a subgame-perfect
equilibrium, then the critical discount factor δTT depends on the stage-game param-
eters according to
δTT = t − lh − t . (22)
Lemma 4 shows that the critical discount factor for the mutual-tough case depends
on the primitives of the stage game in a simple and intuitive way. When the discount
factor δ is sufficiently close to 1 (and future payoffs are important), the no-deviation
condition (9) is non-binding. According to Lemma 3, the endogenously determined p∗
of the TTIR strategy is strictly decreasing in δ (between δTT and 1). As δ decreases (and
future payoffs become less important), to ensure that the no-deviation condition (9)
holds, p∗ must increase to make deviation more costly. However, the maximum possi-
ble punishment is when p∗ tends to 1. This defines the critical discount factor δTT. As δ
tends to δTT, p∗ (δ) tends to 1 according to (20). Moreover, the no-deviation condition
at the bad turn becomes binding according to (21), and the punishment approaches
the Nash punishment (of choosing T with probability 1 at every period). Thus, as δ
approaches δTT, V ∗ (δ) approaches t + δTTt + δ2TTt + . . . = t1−δTT . Substituting this
result and (7) into (21) lead to
l + δTTh
1 − δ2TT
= lim
δ→δTT
V L (δ) = lim
δ→δTT
[
t + δV ∗ (δ)] = t + δTT
(
t
1 − δTT
)
. (21a)
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Simplifying (21a), we can determine the critical discount factor as in (22).
Having determined δTT according to (22), we now show that for the mutual-tough
case, for all δ ∈ (δTT, 1), there exists a unique TTIR strategy profile that can be
supported as an equilibrium and it is symmetric.
Proposition 2 For the repeated game G∞ with t > l, there exists a unique TTIR
strategy profile that can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only if
δ ∈ (δTT, 1), where δTT is given by (22). When δ ∈ (δTT, 1), the equilibrium profile is
symmetric, with each player’s equilibrium randomization probability given by (13) if
a = 0 in (15) or by (14) if a = 0 in (15).
Proposition 2 shows that for the TTIR strategy to constitute a subgame-perfect equi-
librium in the mutual-tough case, the discount factor must be larger than the critical
discount factor δTT = t−lh−t . If the players are not sufficiently patient (with the discount
factor smaller than δTT), a player who is supposed to take the bad turn and play S in the
turn-taking phase will deviate to play T . Thus, the TTIR strategy cannot be supported
as an equilibrium when the players are not sufficiently patient.12
This is in sharp contrast to the accommodating case, in which the TTIR strategy
can be supported as an equilibrium for any discount factor. According to (9), a player
who is supposed to take the bad turn according to the TTIR strategy will not deviate
if the current gain from deviating, t − l , is smaller than the future loss from devi-
ating, δ
(
V H − V ∗). When t < l (i.e., the accommodating case), this condition is
satisfied for any discount factor because deviation actually yields a current loss, not
a gain. When t > l (i.e., the mutual-tough case), however, deviation yields a current
gain. If the discount factor is too low, then (9) cannot be satisfied no matter how the
randomization probability (which affects a player’s intertemporal payoff) is chosen.
There is a trade-off between current gain and future loss if a player deviates from the
equilibrium strategy. It is this trade-off that distinguishes the analysis and results of
the mutual-tough case from those of the accommodating case.
4.3 Alternative punishment strategies
In the above analyzes, we assume that any defection during the turn-taking phase will
trigger a switch back to the randomization phase, and this randomization phase will
continue until randomization gets the players to an asymmetric outcome again. Con-
sider a different TTIR strategy with the following punishment strategy: each player
uses the strategy that leads to the symmetric equilibrium of the stage game (i.e.,
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for the accommodating case, or (T, T ) for
the mutual-tough case). Another possibility is to punish the player that deviates by
restarting the turn-taking path at her bad turn with the other player restarting at her
12 Consider a non-standard prisoners’ dilemma with h = 6, s = 2.3, t = 2 and l = −1, which is similar to
the game in Dixit and Skeath (1999, p. 359, Fig. 11.2) except for the value of t . The stage game parameters
satisfy (3) to (5), and δTT = 0.75 according to (22). If δ = 0.7, then it can be shown that a player will deviate
when she is supposed to take the bad turn. Thus, the TTIR strategy cannot be supported as an equilibrium
when δ is not high enough.
123
Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation 181
good turn. This punishment strategy does not treat players symmetrically, but the pun-
ishment path is efficient. It can be shown that with either one of these punishment
strategies, the no-deviation conditions (8) and (9) during the turn-taking phase are
satisfied for all δ ∈ (0, 1) in the accommodating case, or for δ ∈ (δTT, 1) in the
mutual-tough case. More generally, for any credible punishment that deters defec-
tion during the turn-taking phase, the analysis in the randomization phase is the same
as above. In particular, p∗ and V ∗, which are related by (11) with symmetric TTIR
strategies, are the same as above. Consequently, we obtain the same behavioral impli-
cations whenever an alternative punishment strategy prevents players from deviating
from equilibrium behavior.
5 Testable implications
In this section, we consider two sets of comparative static results, regarding the time
in reaching the turn-taking path (for both accommodating and mutual-tough cases)
and the critical discount factor (for the mutual-tough case).
5.1 Delay in reaching the turn-taking path
When a TTIR profile constitutes an equilibrium, each player chooses T with probabil-
ity p∗ in the randomization phase. Therefore, the probability that the players succeed
in reaching an asymmetric outcome in a particular period during this phase is given
by 2p∗ (1 − p∗). Define the number of time periods taken by the players using the
TTIR strategy to reach the turn-taking path as the delay (D). The delay is a geometric
random variable and its expected value is
E (D) = 1
2p∗ (1 − p∗) . (23)
We define two concepts related to payoffs h and l in the stage game of G. In the stage
game, the maximum and minimum amounts of the players’ total gain attained as a result
of reaching an asymmetric outcome are h + l − min {2s, 2t} and h + l − max {2s, 2t},
respectively. Holding the value of s and t constant, a rise in h + l increases both the
maximum and the minimum gains that the players attain when they reach an asym-
metric outcome. Therefore, we define
λ = h + l (24)
as the efficiency gain parameter when achieving either one of the two asymmetric
outcomes. We also define
θ = h
l
(25)
as the conflict of interest parameter. Without loss of generality, we can normalize the
payoffs so that l > 0. As a result, λ > 0 and θ > 1 according to (3), (24), and (25).
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Table 3 Two games of chicken which only differ in the value of θ
(a) A game of chicken with s = 90, t = 10, λ = 200, and θ = 4
1\2 Tough Soft
Tough (10, 10) (160, 40)
Soft (40, 160) (90, 90)
(b) A game of chicken with s = 90, t = 10, λ = 200, and θ = 9
1\2 Tough Soft
Tough (10, 10) (180, 20)
Soft (20, 180) (90, 90)
From (24) and (25), we can obtain h = θλ1+θ and = λ1+θ . While the original spec-
ification of the stage game uses the four parameters s, t, h, and l as primitives, the
game can also be expressed in terms of parameters s, t, λ, and θ . This is illustrated
in the bottom panel of Table 1. This re-specification is useful for some comparative
static analysis, as will be shown in Proposition 3. When the efficiency parameter λ, as
well as s and t , are held constant, an increase in θ implies that there is a higher degree
of conflict in the stage game. This can be illustrated in Table 3 involving two games
of chicken. The top panel corresponds to the case when s = 90, t = 10, λ = 200,
and θ = 4. The game in the bottom panel is obtained from increasing the degree of
conflict to θ = 9 , with the values of the other three parameters held constant.
It is natural to conjecture that an increase in the degree of distributional conflict
will induce the players to behave more aggressively in choosing Tough with a higher
probability at the randomization phase. As a result, the expected value of delay will
be increased. It turns out that this conjecture is correct for most but not all games. The
following Proposition shows that an increase in the degree of conflict (θ) will increase
expected delay in the mutual-tough case, but may decrease equilibrium delay in a
range of θ for a number of games (including game of chicken) in the accommodating
case.
Proposition 3 (a) For the TTIR strategy profile that constitutes an equilibrium in
the repeated game G∞ with t > l and δ ∈ (δTT, 1), the expected delay is always
increasing in the degree of conflict (θ) of the stage game.
(b) For the TTIR strategy profile that constitutes an equilibrium in the repeated game
G∞ with t < l and δ ∈ (0, 1), the expected delay is always increasing in θ if
t ≥ s. However, if s > t , there exist games in which the expected delay is not
always increasing in θ .
The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. Since a change in the degree of conflict
only affects expected delay through its effect on the equilibrium randomization proba-
bility, we have ∂ E(D)
∂θ
= ∂ E(D)
∂p∗ × ∂p
∗
∂θ
. We know from (23) that E (D) reaches its min-
imum at p∗ = 0.5. Furthermore, E (D) is decreasing in p∗ when 0 < p∗ < 0.5, but
is increasing in p∗ when 0.5 < p∗ < 1. Thus, ∂ E(D)
∂p∗ > 0 if and only if 0.5 < p
∗ < 1.
On the other hand, it can be shown that
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∂p∗
∂θ
=
∂V H
∂θ
− p∗
[
∂
(
V H+V L)
∂θ
]
(
V H − s − δV ∗) + (V L − t − δV ∗) + δ (1 − 2p∗) ∂V ∗
∂p∗
, (26)
and the numerator on the right-hand side of (26) is positive. For the denominator,
two of the three terms are positive because the no-deviation conditions hold at the
equilibrium. The third term, δ (1 − 2p∗) ∂V ∗
∂p∗ , is also positive if 0.5 < p
∗ < 1. Thus,
∂p∗
∂θ
> 0 if 0.5 < p∗ < 1. Combining these results, we conclude that 0.5 < p∗ < 1
is a sufficient condition for ∂ E(D)
∂θ
> 0.
For the mutual-tough case and the accommodating case with t ≥ s, it can be shown
that 0.5 < p∗ < 1. In these games, the payoff parameters are such that each player
chooses Tough with an equilibrium probability higher than 0.5 in the randomization
phase to ensure that her opponent is indifferent in choosing Tough or Soft. When θ
increases, the intertemporal efficiency gain from turn taking is more unevenly distrib-
uted, and it becomes more attractive to be the first player to take the good turn. Thus,
each player behaves more aggressively in choosing Tough with a higher probability.
Since the increase in equilibrium randomization probability occurring in the range
(0.5, 1) means that each player’s probability of playing Tough is further away from
0.5, the probability of reaching the turn-taking path in a particular period, given by
2p∗ (1 − p∗), is reduced. As a result, expected delay increases because of the players’
more aggressive behavior.
The condition 0.5 < p∗ < 1 is not always satisfied in the accommodating case
when s > t . We have performed computational analysis for these games and found
counter-intuitive pattern that E (D) is not always increasing in θ . We present one such
counter-example as an illustration. Consider the games of chicken with s = 90, t = 10,
λ = 200, δ = 0.6 and θ ranging from 2 to 10. In all these games, h > s > l > t.
Figure 1 shows that when θ is relatively small, the equilibrium randomization prob-
ability is less than 0.5. This is because the payoff at the outcome (Tough, Tough)
is relatively unattractive in these games of chicken, and each player chooses Tough
with a probability less than 0.5 to ensure that her opponent is willing to randomize
between T and S. In this example, when θ increases and being the first player to take
the good turn becomes more attractive, the equilibrium value p∗ increases. However,
since 0 < p∗ < 0.5 when θ is relatively small, an increase in p∗ means that it is
getting closer to 0.5 and thus, expected delay will decrease. This explains the counter-
intuitive result. On the other hand, when θ is relatively large and the efficiency gain of
turn taking is more unevenly distributed, even though a player’s current-period payoff
at the outcome (Tough, Tough) is still unattractive, the higher level of θ will tilt the
trade-off of choosing T versus S in favor of the former. As a result, 0.5 < p∗ < 1.
In this range of θ , the positive relationship between E (D) and θ is qualitatively the
same as the mutual-tough case. Combining the above results, we observe the U-shaped
pattern between E (D) and θ for the games of chicken in Figure 2.13
13 Note that the variation of E (D) with respect to θ in Fig. 2 is quite small. This is because we choose
the parameters of the games of chicken to illustrate the non-monotonic relationship of E (D) with respect
to θ , and thus p∗ moves from below 0.5 to above 0.5. Since the values of p∗ in Fig. 2 are close to 0.5,
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Fig. 1 p∗ as a function of θ (for games of chicken)
Fig. 2 Expected value of delay as a function of θ (for games of chicken)
5.2 Critical discount factor (for the mutual-tough case)
The critical discount factor δTT for the mutual-tough case is given in Lemma 4. We first
examine how the critical discount factor is affected by a change in parameter t . Note
that the left-hand term of (21a) is a player’s intertemporal payoff of adhering to the
equilibrium strategy when her bad turn comes up, whereas the right-hand term is the
intertemporal payoff of defecting. An increase in t (at an unchanged δTT) will increase
the current and future payoffs of defecting. To restore the equilibrium condition (21a),
the corresponding values of E (D) are close to 2 and do not vary much. We have also found other games
in which the changes in expected delay with respect to θ are more substantial and are monotonic. Those
games would be more useful for designing experiments to test the theoretical predictions in this article.
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the critical discount factor has to increase. Formally, differentiating δTT with respect
to t gives
∂δTT
∂t
= h − l
(h − t)2 > 0, (27)
because of (3) and (5). Holding the value of h and l constant, an increase in t (up to
h+l
2 ) causes δTT to rise. As a result, the interval (δTT, 1) becomes narrower, and it is
less likely that the TTIR strategy can be supported as an equilibrium.
We also study how changes in the degree of conflict and the efficiency gain affect
the critical discount factor for the mutual-tough case. The critical discount factor in
(22) can be expressed as a function of t, θ , and λ as follows:
δTT = t − lh − t =
(1 + θ) t − λ
θλ − (1 + θ) t . (22a)
Because t > l > 0 and λ = h + l > 2t , we have
∂δTT
∂θ
= λ (λ − 2t)[θλ − (1 + θ) t]2 > 0, (28)
and
∂δTT
∂λ
= −t
(
θ2 − 1)
[θλ − (1 + θ) t]2 < 0. (29)
Equation (28) says that δTT is increasing in θ , which means that an increase in the
degree of conflict makes it less likely that the TTIR strategy can be supported as an equi-
librium. An increase in distributional conflict (when other parameters are unchanged)
implies that the player’s payoff at the bad turn during the turn-taking phase is rela-
tively unattractive. As a result, the players have a greater incentive to defect (at a given
discount factor), and supporting the TTIR strategy as an equilibrium requires a higher
critical discount factor.
Equation (29) says that δTT is decreasing in λ, which means that a decrease in the
efficiency gain from achieving either of the asymmetric outcomes (provided that (4)
and (5) still hold) leads to an increase in δTT, and makes it less likely that the TTIR
strategy can be supported as an equilibrium.
We summarize the above results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 For the repeated game G∞ with t > l and δ ∈ (δTT, 1), there exists
a unique TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as an equilibrium. An increase
in t , an increase in θ , or a decrease in λ will lead to a higher critical discount factor
δTT, and make it less likely that the TTIR strategy can be supported as an equilibrium.
6 Concluding remarks
Motivated by the importance of turn-taking behavior in many field and experimental
settings, this article develops an analysis of turn taking in a repeated symmetric 2 × 2
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game that nests many widely studied games as special cases. Our specification of
one-period alternation in the TTIR strategies, and our analysis on the delay in reach-
ing the turn-taking path, are inspired by experimental findings. The unified analysis of
turn-taking behavior in these well-known games generates novel testable implications,
which provides guidance for new laboratory experiments examining how differences
in the structure of the strategic environment affect the effectiveness of turn taking as a
mechanism for intertemporal cooperation. For example, our analysis predicts that the
expected delay in reaching the turn-taking path is always increasing in the degree of
conflict of the stage game for the mutual-tough case. This prediction and related ones
for the accommodating case can be tested in controlled laboratory experiments that
systematically vary the degree of conflict.
In this article, we analyze turn taking in a benchmark model that does not allow
for communication. However, the results reported in Ostrom et al. (1994) suggest that
nonbinding communication can be efficiency-enhancing in the laboratory repeated
games. On the other hand, the experimental results in Prisbrey (1992) suggest that
asymmetric turn-taking schemes—for example, one in which a player is supposed to
take the good turn for two periods and then take the bad turn for one period, with her
opponent doing the opposite—are more difficult to sustain. In the future, we plan to
investigate whether extending the model to incorporate different kinds of asymmetry
and/or communication will make it easier or more difficult for the (potentially more
sophisticated) turn-taking strategies to achieve intertemporal cooperation.
Finally, the model considered in this article rules out the possibility that a player
may attempt to “modify the game” to her advantage. However, in environments related
to deciding whether turn taking can be used to determine, for example, who will be
the chairperson of a department or which nation will chair an important international
committee, players may be reluctant to take the bad turn because they are concerned
that the player who gets to take the good turn in a particular period may attempt to alter
the game to her advantage. A fruitful direction for future research is to investigate, in
such an environment, when and how some kind of turn-taking strategies may still be
able to mitigate the coordination and conflict problems that are more difficult than the
one considered in our benchmark model.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We are going to prove that, first, the solution to the two con-
ditions in (12) exists and, second, it is unique and symmetric. We then show that this
solution satisfies (8) and (9).
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Existence. It suffices to prove the existence of symmetric TTIR strategies with
p1 = p2 = p that satisfy (12). To apply well-known mathematical results, we extend
the domain of p from (0, 1) to [0, 1]. We define the continuous function
f (p) = V
H − s − δV (p)[
V H − s − δV (p)] + [V L − t − δV (p)] (A1)
over p ∈ [0, 1], where V (p) = Vi (p, p) is defined according to (10). It is easy to
observe that the symmetric solution to (12) is a fixed point of the function f (.) in
(A1).
According to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, when t < l, (8a) and (9a) hold for any
p ∈ (0, 1). We conclude from (A1) that 0 < f (p) < 1. Moreover, it is easy to show
that 0 < f (0) < 1 and 0 < f (1) < 1. Therefore, f (.) is a continuous function
from the compact set [0, 1] to itself. Applying the Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem,
we conclude that this function has a fixed point. That is, there exists a p ∈ [0, 1]
such that f (p) = p. Moreover, since f (0) > 0 and f (1) < 1, we conclude that
f (p) = p does not hold at p = 0 or p = 1, and the solution to (12) exists in the open
interval (0, 1).
Uniqueness and symmetry. We now establish that only one pair of
(
p∗1, p∗2
)
satisfies
the conditions in (12), and that the unique equilibrium is symmetric (p∗1 = p∗2). Note
that (11) leads to
V ∗i =
p∗j t +
(
1 − p∗j
)
V H
1 − δp∗j
=
p∗j V L +
(
1 − p∗j
)
s
1 − δ
(
1 − p∗j
) . (A2)
Substituting (6) and (7) into the second equality of (A2) and simplifying give
a
(
p∗j
)2 + bp∗j + c = 0, (A3)
where j = 1, 2 and a, b and c are given in (15) to (17).14 From (15) to (17), we know
that c > 0 but that a and b can be either positive, negative or zero.
Since (A3) is a quadratic equation in p∗j , there are at most two real roots. Together
with the existence result above, there must be either one or two p∗j in the interval
(0, 1). From standard results for quadratic equations, we know that if a = 0, then
there is just one p∗j and it is given by (13). If a = 0, the two roots to (A3) are given
by (14) and
p∗j =
−b + √b2 − 4ac
2a
. (A4)
14 A common approach to show the uniqueness of equilibrium is to use the Contraction Mapping Theorem.
We have, however, found some counterexamples for the mutual-tough case (such as h = 160, l = 40, t =
80, s = 20 and δ = 0.75) that f in (A1) is not a contraction mapping. Hence, we use a different approach.
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Since at least one p∗j lies in (0, 1), either (14) or (A4), but not both, may lie outside
the interval (0, 1).
We can further show that (a) if a < 0, then p∗j in (A4) is negative; (b) if a > 0 and
b > 0, then p∗j in (A4) is negative; (c) if a > 0 and b < 0, then p∗j in (A4) is larger
than 1 for all δ ∈ (0, 1); and (d) b = 0 is inconsistent with a > 0 and b2 − 4ac ≥ 0.
Therefore, whether a in (15) is positive or negative, p∗j in (A4) does not lie in the
interval (0, 1).
Consequently, there is only one solution to (12) that satisfies 0 < p∗j < 1, and the
solution is given by (13) if a = 0 or (14) if a = 0. Moreover, p∗1 = p∗2 = p∗ since
both of them are defined according to (13) or (14).
Finally, applying Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is easy to see that the unique solution
to (12) also satisfies the no-deviation conditions (8) and (9). We conclude that there is
a unique TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as an equilibrium for G∞ with
t < l for all δ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, it is symmetric. 	unionsq
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